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CONTRA CLAYTON: TOWARD 
AN AUGUSTINIAN MODEL OF ORGANISM
Nathan Jacobs
In this essay, I examine Philip Clayton's efforts to construct a philosophical 
theology that fits the current scientific view of organism. Clayton capital­
izes on an evolutionary outlook, which sees organism as an emergent entity 
composed of lower organic unities, and which, at the highest level of organic 
development (brain), yields an emergent, non-physical phenomenon (mind). 
Presuming a bilateral relationship between mind and body, Clayton argues 
for a picture of God-world relations where world is analogous to body and 
God is analogous to emergent mind. Contrary to Clayton, I argue that pan- 
entheism does not naturally accommodate the current scientific picture of or­
ganic development, and as an alternative, I submit St. Augustine of Hippo's 
theistic modifications to Plotinian NeoPlatonism. My goal is to demonstrate 
that Augustine's metaphysic offers a strong foundation for the construction of 
a theologically robust and scientifically satisfying philosophy of organism.
Introduction
In "Panentheism in Metaphysical and Scientific Perspective," Philip Clayton 
submits that the best argument for panentheism is a "cumulative case."1 
Clayton's sizeable and largely uncontested corpus exemplifies this cumu­
lative approach by defending panentheism from a variety of angles, rang­
ing from the history of Modern thought to matters of biological evolution 
and the emergence of mind.2 The aspect of Clayton's case for panentheism 
I examine in this paper is Clayton's strategy of constructing a philosophi­
cal theology that fits comfortably with the current scientific understand­
ing of organism. More specifically, Clayton capitalizes on an evolutionary 
outlook, which sees organism as an emergent entity composed of lower 
organic unities, and which, at the highest level of organic development 
(brain), yields an emergent, non-physical phenomenon (mind). Presum­
ing a bilateral relationship between mind and body, Clayton argues for 
a picture of God-world relations where world is analogous to body and 
God is analogous to emergent mind.3 This panentheistic analogy, Clayton 
believes, "provides the best available means, for those who take science 
seriously, to rethink . . . the immanence of God in the world."4 In what 
follows, I will argue, contrary to Clayton, that panentheism does not natu­
rally accommodate the current scientific picture of organic development. 
And while Clayton is skeptical regarding the staying power of classical 
theism in the light of contemporary science, I will demonstrate that St.
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Augustine of Hippo's theistic modifications to Plotinian (panentheistic) 
NeoPlatonism offer a strong foundation for constructing a theologically 
robust and scientifically satisfying philosophy of organism.5
The structure of this paper is simple. In section one, I offer an over­
view of Clayton's case for panentheism based on emergentism and the 
philosophy of organism displayed in biological evolution. In section two, I 
draw out a conceptual problem facing Clayton's project. Finally, in section 
three, I lay bare my defense of Augustinian metaphysics as a viable alter­
native for developing a contemporary model of organism. My argument, 
in a nutshell, is this: panentheism faces serious difficulties in its efforts 
to appropriate the contemporary picture of organic emergence because 
panentheism, with its notion of divine emanation, is most naturally con­
ducive to a top-down picture of emergence—as opposed to the bottom- 
up emergence of modern science. While this framework can be adjusted, 
Clayton rejects what, I will argue, are the most viable options for inverting 
this model, thereby inhibiting his panentheism from properly paralleling 
the contemporary understanding of organic emergence. Augustine, by 
contrast, seeks to maintain a Creator-creature gap. In so doing, he envi­
sions creation as emerging out of nothing and moving upward toward 
God. This modification to Plotinian metaphysics inverts the top-down 
emergence of panentheism, creating a metaphysic that naturally accom­
modates the contemporary understanding of organic development.
Clayton's Emergent Panentheism
As mentioned above, Clayton's particular form of panentheism is based 
largely on the philosophy of mind known as emergentism. Succinctly put, 
emergentism holds that the physical complexities of the brain give rise to 
higher, non-physical mental properties, and these emergent, non-physical 
properties, while dependent on and shaped by their physical ground, are 
not reducible to this physical ground. Rather, mind exists in bilateral rela­
tionship with body.
In the philosophy of mind, emergentism attempts to offer a middle 
ground between the dualism-materialism dichotomy by identifying mind 
as genuinely dependant on material complexities, while refusing to reduce 
mind to brain. Clayton holds that science—with its basic evolutionary as- 
sumptions6—supports the emergentist model by telling a story of organic 
development akin to the one emergentism tells about mind. According 
to evolution, lower organic entities combine into more complex wholes, 
and from these complex unities, higher entities and phenomena emerge, 
which are not reducible to their lower organic members. Thus, Clayton 
contends, "The evolutionary perspective has fatally undercut both sides 
of the once regnant either/or: physicalism, with its tendency to stress the 
sufficiency of physics, and dualism, with its tendency to pull mind out of 
the evolutionary account altogether."7 If lower complexities give rise to 
higher entities and phenomena in biological development, then we can, 
with intellectual integrity, view mind as the highest level phenomenon to 
emerge out of organic evolution.
Clayton maintains that emergentism—contrary to reductive physi- 
calism or dualism—is able to embrace the findings of neurophysiology,
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while simultaneously leaving a window open through which freedom 
may climb. Given evolutionary assumptions of emergence, a significant 
dependence of mind on brain is expected; yet, because emergentism does 
not reduce mind to brain, emergentism is able to conceive of emergent, 
non-physical mind as freely supervening on its physical ground—hence 
giving rise to a bilateral relationship between mind and body. Clayton 
labels this position "emergentist supervenience."8
To the extent biological evolution presses us imaginatively beyond 
deterministic physics and toward emergent, non-physical properties, 
Clayton thinks we have a basis for moving from science to metaphysics 
in general and to theology in particular. Emergentism provides a "scien­
tifically palatable" picture of physical-non-physical interactions, and in 
so doing, the emergentist model provides an analogy for God-world re- 
lations—a model that is decisively panentheistic: "The world is in some 
sense analogous to the body of God; God is analogous to the mind which 
indwells the body, though God is also more than the natural world taken 
as a whole."9 As Clayton sees it, "The strength of the panentheistic anal­
ogy is that it takes the highest level of emergence known to us and uses it 
as a model for the divine reality. The highest level we know is the level of 
human personhood: the emergence of mind . . . from the most complicated 
biological structure yet discovered, the human body and brain."10
Contrary to supernatural models of divine action, which see act prin­
cipally as interruption in the natural order, emergentist panentheism 
"suggest[s] that there is no qualitative or ontological difference between 
the regularity of natural law and the intentionality of special divine ac­
tions . . . . Instead, natural laws, when viewed theologically, will count as 
descriptions of the predictable regularity of patterns of divine action."11 
With such a shift in perspective on God-world relations, Clayton suggests 
that we can readily conceive of God and world in bilateral relationship: 
rather than God simply affecting the world unilaterally, the world-in-God 
affects God.12 As Clayton puts it,
This way of conceiving the God/world relationship makes the re­
lationship of Creator and created as close as it can possibly be without 
dissolving the difference-in-nature between the infinite God and the finite 
created world . . . God is always present within the individual human, 
knowing every thought and every desire and knowing it automatical­
ly and immediately—not as one listening in from the outside, but as 
one who is bound up with the very nature of the individual person.13
Much like the mind-body relationship in emergentism, we find here a genu­
ine contingency in the divine life. God, in a very real way, "depends on the 
world because the nature of God's actual experience depends on interac­
tions with finite creatures like ourselves."14 As in process thought, aspects 
of divine knowledge and experience are dependent upon creation—they 
could not exist without the world—and the nature of this knowledge and 
experience therefore hinges on the type of world God creates.15
The evolutionary understanding of biological life thus fuels the "scien­
tific" side of Clayton's panentheism, giving legitimacy to the emergentist 
conception of bilateral physical-non-physical interaction between God
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and world. Clayton, in short, understands evolution to point decisively 
toward an emergent model of mind, which may readily adapt to a robust 
theological model for God-world relations. The movement to emergence 
(and by extension, to emergent panentheism), Clayton submits, is "born 
in the crucible of the sciences, that can lead to the category of divinity or 
spirituality as an emergent property in evolution."16
Testing the Analogy of Emergence
Clayton clearly views the analogy of emergence as the most capable anal­
ogy for explaining God-world relations. When applying the emergentist 
analogy to the God-world relationship, however, we find a somewhat 
queer result: God stands at the apex of the Chain of Being (in both classi­
cal and emergent panentheism), and from God all being flows. Yet, within 
the emergentist framework, the downward movement of this flow must 
be inverted.
In classical panentheism, such as that of Plotinus, the ontological top- 
down movement of the Chain of Being implies a chronological top-down 
flow of emergence. God, or The One, is the Being from whom all other 
beings derive their existence.17 Creation comes to be as the being of The 
One emanates or pours forth in a necessary super-overflow, and in this 
overflow lower entities emerge.18 The picture is of a flow from greatest 
to least, as if the being of The One pours forth with a funnel-like charac­
ter. Conceptually we might say the greatness of an entity corresponds to 
the quantity of being it receives from The One, which is determined by 
where it stands in the overflow: entities that emerge early in the emana­
tion process are greater than those that emerge later.19 Hence, in classical 
panentheism, creaturely beings emerge in a top-down order-greatest to 
least, not least to greatest, as in emergentism.
German idealism managed to invert panentheism's top-down concep­
tual framework by suggesting that the movement from potentiality to 
actuality applies as much to God as to creatures. Hegel argues that God, 
or the Absolute, contains within himself the perfections that comprise the 
Chain of Being. Yet, God bears the plentitude of perfections only implicitly, 
for in God perfections are without division.20 Seeing creaturely perfections 
as first implicit in God's own being—albeit without division—was not 
a Hegelian novelty. John Duns Scotus offered a very similar claim in his 
univocity doctrine long before Hegel.21 Yet, Hegel's uniqueness lies in his 
claim, "Consciousness . . . is a differentiating, a division within itself,"22 
and therefore, neither consciousness nor self-understanding is possible for 
God unless God "finitize" himself. God must dialectically exegete his per­
fections, as it were, moving them from implicit to explicit. In objective ide­
alism, this process of differentiation is simultaneously God's act of creation 
and God's movement toward self-actualization and self-understanding.23 
As Eric Rust puts it, "history and nature are to be understood in rational 
terms as objects of that dialectical process in which the Absolute spells it­
self out in time and without which the Absolute would be 'lifeless, solitary, 
and alone.'"24
Both divine and creaturely essence, therefore, has a teleological char­
acter in objective idealism. Because potentiality has priority over actuality
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for the objective idealists, essence is not what is actual now; essence is 
what will be actual in the future and is only implicit in the earliest stages 
of existence.25 In this way, the objective idealists were able to circumscribe 
the Chain of Being with God on all sides: God stands at the lowest point in 
his potentiality as well as at the highest point in his actuality.26 The Chain 
of Being therefore proceeds from God in an upward movement: the God 
of the beginning, from whom primordial creation proceeds, lacks self­
understanding and bears perfections only implicitly, and being unfolds in 
history toward the God of the future, who is explicit in perfection and in 
possession of self-understanding.
While Germany was able to provide a form of panentheism that moves 
upward in both ontology and chronology, unclear to me is Clayton's abil­
ity to adhere to this peculiar solution. Clayton, without question, appreci­
ates the trajectory of German philosophy. In The Problem of God in Modern 
Thought, Schelling is the hero of the story, as it were.27 Yet, Clayton is not 
a pure Schellingian. Schelling stands out as the hero for Clayton because 
Schelling undoes (what appears to be) the deterministic/necessitarian im­
plications of Hegel's system, restoring both divine and human freedom 
to objective idealism's panentheistic framework. But Clayton parts ways 
with Schelling in a key area, namely, Schelling's speculation into the inner 
being of God.28 What I find problematic about this maneuver on Clayton's 
part is that, if I understand Schelling correctly, such speculation is the very 
thing that allows him to retain freedom within an idealist framework. To 
understand why Schelling offered such speculation, we must briefly con­
sider the philosophical context in which he writes.
Objective idealism emerged on the heels of a crisis in metaphysics. Hav­
ing abandoned the classical form-matter distinction and substance catego­
ries of Aristotle, Rene Descartes reduced all substance to two: physical 
and mental. The former Descartes identified with extension,29 and in so 
doing, Descartes (and the Cartesians) were forced to deny the existence 
of empty space—wherever extension is, so is matter. As for the appear­
ance of empty space in the plenum, this, argued the Cartesians, is in fact 
ether.30 Such a conclusion created a problem for physical-non-physical in­
teraction: if matter is extension, where does mental substance reside, and 
how does it relate to or interact with matter? Few candidates emerged for 
again conjoining the newly separated spheres of mind and body. Two op­
tions presented themselves: make physical and non-physical substances 
independent spheres that are programmed by God to look as though they 
interact, even though they do not (per occasionalism); or collapse physical 
and non-physical by asserting that only one substance exists, namely, God 
(per Spinoza's pantheism).
A third escape route eventually presented itself in Immanuel Kant's 
subjective idealism. By focusing on the thinking subject and making sub­
stance categories into categories of mind, Kant bypassed the substance 
crisis, and soon the objective idealism of Hegel and Schelling combined 
Spinoza's single-substance solution with Kant's turn to the subject: the 
Absolute Geist undergirds all things, making differentiation in creation 
and history the unfolding of God himself; yet, this differentiation is not 
differentiation of substance, but idealized differentiation in mind through 
finite, thinking subjects.31
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Objective idealism came at a cost, however. In embracing Spinoza's 
single-substance trajectory, and in linking the finitizing of God with the 
history of thinking subjects, objective idealism invariably made the cre­
ation of world and its historical unfolding the necessary result of God's 
movement toward self-understanding. Since the Chain of Being and its 
history are first implicit in the Absolute, so long as God moves toward 
self-knowledge, the Absolute will be finitized, and the dialectical prog­
ress of this chain in history will come to pass. Therefore, where God is, 
world and history must follow. Such was the plight of German idealism. 
Schelling understood this all too well.32
To make room for freedom, Schelling employed a bold strategy: he 
chose to make God the source of both Being and Non-Being (Grund and 
Ungrund). Schelling speaks of "the ground of [God's] existence,"33 which 
is a type of primordial potentiality, not unlike the Platonic concept of mat­
ter. For Schelling, however, all exists in God.34 Therefore this potential­
ity sits within the bowels of the Deity as the ground of both creaturely 
and divine potentiality and existence: "since there can be nothing outside 
God, this contradiction [of a creature having a capacity for evil from a 
potency outside God] can only be solved by things having their basis in 
that within God which is not God himself, i.e., in that which is the basis of 
his existence."35
God therefore holds within himself the full spectrum of ontology, for 
Schelling. Both Being and Non-Being are part of the divine, but neither can 
claim to be the Absolute. Schelling used this duality within God to create 
equilibrium in the Deity. The eternal Yes and the eternal No cancel each 
other out, and this equilibrium creates room for divine freedom as that 
which stands over both potencies. Since both Being and Non-Being have 
no will regarding what they move toward—they each constitute move­
ment in only one direction—divine freedom must stand over both, as the 
only potency capable of ending the equilibrium. As Schelling puts it, "the 
first [nature can] only grow silent before something higher, before which 
it happily and voluntarily acknowledges itself as mere Being, as not hav­
ing being."36 Schelling thus argued that God faces the primordial decision 
whether to be or not be. This decision, argues Schelling, is the very thing 
that provides God with freedom regarding whether or not to create the 
world: if God possesses freedom in reference to his own existence, then 
the existence of the world that flows from God is also contingent on God's 
willingness to choose Being.37
Clayton rejects Schelling's speculation into the inner life of God, and 
argues in favor of retaining some notion of God's robust pre-creation ex­
istence and actuality. While Clayton may be quite sober in his rejection of 
Schelling's speculations, in so doing he moves contrary to the foundation 
of Schelling's defense of divine freedom, namely, God's primordial deci­
sion whether to be or not be. By ascribing to the Deity essential proper­
ties, not entirely unlike the divine attributes of classical theism, Clayton 
diverges from the implicit-explicit distinction of objective idealism; and 
by rejecting Schelling's speculation into the inner being of God, Clayton 
parts ways with the very thing that enables Schelling to restore freedom 
within his panentheistic framework. The only remaining connection be­
tween Clayton's views and Schelling's (that I can see) is that both retreat
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to panentheism in the wake of Descartes, and both attempt to affirm di­
vine and human freedom amid panentheism. But unclear, to my mind, 
is how Clayton can retreat to the bottom-up movement of German ideal­
ism, given what he rejects in Schelling and what he keeps from orthodox 
Christian theology.
Outside of idealism, few other panentheistic models allow for a bottom- 
up order of emergence. One remaining option is a radically emergent 
panentheism. That is, Clayton's emergentism could fit the idea that God 
emerges out of world. In this scheme, the most basic aspects of the world 
emerge first and evolve into more complex forms, giving rise to higher en­
tities. Since science tells us "The highest level [of emergence] we know is 
the level of human personhood,"38 we would be justified in presuming that 
the world-organism may have, at some point, given rise to God—the high­
est emergent entity, produced by the vast complexities of the universe.
Samuel Alexander espouses this type of panentheism.39 The difficulty, 
however, is that Clayton rejects Alexander's view outright, and regrettably, 
Clayton does not give clear explanation of the exact differences between 
himself and Alexander.40 Clear enough is that Clayton believes God retains 
essential attributes whether or not the world exists.41 What Clayton leaves 
unclear is how his view is in proper keeping with emergentism, despite 
his rejection of Alexander. Alexander's view, even if odd and full of its own 
problems, is the most self-evident application of the emergentist analogy: 
higher phenomena emerge out of lower organic complexities; mind is the 
highest phenomena in human experience; therefore, we may presume that 
God is an emergent phenomenon resulting from the complexities of our 
universe. By rejecting Alexander's view, and by maintaining, contrary to 
the objective idealists, that the essential divine attributes are explicit prior 
to creation, Clayton cuts off both of the most obvious avenues for which 
the emergentist analogy may serve as a proper analogy.
In this light, we may ask: in what sense is the God-world relationship 
properly analogous to the emergence of mind for Clayton? Clearly Clayton 
thinks the emergentist model helps resolve mind-body problems and thus 
may serve as a model for God-world relations. Yet, within Clayton's under­
standing of panentheism, God, who is supposedly analogous to emergent 
mind, does not emerge out of the lower complexities that make up our 
world, nor is God somehow merely implicit prior to the world. Clayton's 
God possesses essential attributes much like those of classical theism and 
faces a voluntaristic decision whether or not to create the world—a deci­
sion far more like what we find in orthodox Christianity than what we find 
in Schelling. In what way, then, may the emergentist analogy be applied to 
God-world relations?
Most likely Clayton wants it both ways: God creates the world (top- 
down), while what is analogous to emergent mind in the God-world 
relationship are the effects the world has on God (bottom-up).42 As men­
tioned in the previous section, Clayton maintains, in a way akin to process 
thought, that aspects of divine experience and knowledge are contingent 
on creation, and in this sense, features of the divine life would not exist 
without the world. Even if right, is this dimension of Clayton's system 
adequate to make the God-world relationship analogous to the emer­
gence of mind? I do not think it is. Certainly my experience of Kingsley is
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contingent on the existence of and my interaction with Kingsley, but the 
experiences that "emerge" out of a relationship with Kingsley are hardly 
analogous to the emergence of mind out of physical complexities (that 
is, assuming an emergent view of mind is correct). If, therefore, the only 
aspect of God that is contingent on the world-within-God is God's experi­
ence and knowledge of the world, the emergence of mental properties out 
of physical conditions is hardly the best analogy for God-world relations.
Perhaps, in light of the foregoing, the most charitable read of Clayton 
is that he intends, not to develop an exact parallel between God-world 
and mind-body relations, but only to forward an analogy that has some 
generally scientific appeal. That is to say, maybe all Clayton really intends 
to argue is that just as mental properties (which are non-physical) are able 
to interact bilaterally with physical properties (per an emergentist model), 
so the non-physical God is able to interact with the physical world. If such 
is Clayton's intent, the claim is broadly consistent, but it can hardly be 
said that the mind-body analogy in this form points decisively toward 
either emergentism or panentheism, as Clayton claims. A theistic dualism 
may just as well affirm that divine interactions are like the interactions 
between non-physical mind and physical body. In fact, if one affirms, as 
Clayton does, that God exists and possesses actuality prior to the existence 
of the world, the mind-body analogy is more appropriately utilized by a 
thorough-going dualist than by an emergentist.
What we see, in short, is that the emergentist analogy, as employed by 
Clayton, is little help in explaining God-world relations. Clayton's presup­
positions regarding the Deity's pre-creation actuality speak against the 
assumptions of emergentism—both against its basic assumptions of bot­
tom-up ontology and chronology, as well as against the idea that mind 
and personality are contingent on the existence of lower complexities. To 
whatever extent the emergentist analogy is meant to be a model for pan- 
entheism, it should point toward either the implicit-explicit movement of 
idealism or the radically emergent panentheism of Alexander. Yet, Clayton 
foregoes both paths to the detriment of the analogy.
Toward an Augustinian Philosophy o f Organism
Prior to moving into my proposed alternative to Clayton, a preemptive 
remark is in order. Clayton's corpus makes the following criticism readily 
available against a proposal like mine: substance metaphysics is dead, and 
therefore, even if Augustinian metaphysics fit more comfortably with the 
current scientific picture of organism, Augustine's NeoPlatonism is a non­
option in our Late-Enlightenment era. In both The Problem o f God in Modern 
Thought and "Panentheism in Metaphysical and Scientific Perspective," 
Clayton traces the collapse of substance metaphysics in an effort to show 
why, given this history of ideas, we must go the panentheistic route.43 
The story Clayton tells was briefly sketched in the above discussion of 
Schelling. As the story goes, in Descartes substance metaphysics found 
itself incapable of offering a basis for physical-non-physical substance in­
teraction. Philosophy was thus pressed decisively away from substance 
metaphysics toward occasionalism on the one hand and single-substance 
pantheism on the other, only later finding an escape route in idealism.
384 Faith and Philosophy
Clayton's narrative is not unique. But regrettably, discussion rarely 
centers on why Descartes's (rather problematic) definition of substance 
should be taken as definitive. I agree that the movement from Descartes 
to Spinoza and on into idealism (both subjective and objective) makes a 
good deal of sense given Descartes's bungle, but if physical-non-physical 
interaction was not a problem for pre-Cartesian philosophies, why pre­
sume Descartes's bungle was the inevitable culmination of substance 
metaphysics? What happened in the sixteenth and seventeenth century 
that made classical substance categories taboo? In keeping with historians 
of science like Marie Boas, I believe the answer to this question lies in the 
sixteenth-seventeenth century tendency to seek purely empirical founda­
tions for science, which ultimately resulted in an anti-Aristotelian, anti­
substantial-form movement.44
Three points are noteworthy about this movement, however. First, the 
bias against substantial form was not rooted in a sudden realization that 
substance metaphysics was problematic. The aim of the anti-substantial- 
form movement, as embodied in figures like Nicholas Hill, Pierre Gassendi, 
Walter Charleton, and Isaac Beeckman, was to enhance the explanatory 
power of the mechanical, atomistic philosophies of Hero, Epicurus, Lu­
cretius, and Democritus. Scientific experimentation was employed with a 
view to bolstering or debunking metaphysical claims.45 It was thought that 
if atomism could be made to explain the plentitude of empirical phenom­
ena (even if its explanations were only speculative), science could move 
ahead without resorting to Aristotle's non-empirical notion of substantial 
form.46 In short, the movement rejected substantial form out of a desire 
for a purely mechanical and empirically-based philosophy. If one is not 
sympathetic to the empiricism of Descartes's era, however, the rejection 
of substantial form by such figures, and the subsequent history on which 
Clayton builds, is anything but inevitable.
Second, the anti-Aristotelian, anti-substantial-form sentiment was not 
unanimous in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. A strong and influ­
ential contingent persisted, which continued to affirm and defend the 
importance of retaining some version of Aristotle's categories. This con­
tingent included figures such as Julius Caesar Scaliger, Gottfried Leibniz, 
and Christian Wolff; and Kant and the post-Kantian idealists are arguably 
the offspring of this school, rather than the children of the anti-Aristote­
lian empiricists.47 In addition to this more overtly philosophical contin­
gent, it is worth pointing out that confessional theology, such as found 
among Dominicans, Franciscans, and Reformed orthodox, also retained 
classical scholastic substance categories, despite whatever trends to the 
contrary in philosophy and burgeoning "scientific" movements.48 I think 
this significance since a great many confessional theologians still exist to 
this day, despite rumors to the contrary.
A third and final point worth noting is that among the contingent that 
chose to abandon Aristotelian form out of a so-called "scientific" bias, this 
anti-Aristotelian maneuver was rooted in a bias against immanent form.49 
As Leroy E. Loemker points out, many within the sixteenth and seven­
teenth century continued to feel that disciplines like mathematics would 
become unstable if all references to form were abolished. Therefore, in the 
seventeenth century, common was the retreat to some type of Platonism,
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where "archetypal" Ideas exist in God, rather than immanently in mat­
ter.50 Even where Aristotelian substantial form was considered suspect, 
the importance of some type of transcendent, Platonic form was, thus, 
often retained as essential to human reason in general and to the basic 
disciplines on which science stood in particular.
While delivering substance metaphysics from the tyranny of Clayton's 
all-too-common narrative is not my concern here—and I will, therefore, 
not belabor the point—suffice it to say I believe the death of substance 
metaphysics is a myth, and while Cartesian metaphysics may go the way 
of the dodo, I see no evidence that classical Hellenistic/Christian substance 
metaphysics are condemned to the same fate. I find such classical models 
perfectly defensible, desirable, and even necessary both historically and 
philosophically.51 Moreover, and perhaps just as important when consid­
ering a project like Clayton's, insofar as classical (as opposed to Cartesian) 
substance metaphysics come ready-made with, not only the possibility, 
but the givenness of material-immaterial interaction—form and matter 
are both necessarily present wherever empirical objects exist—I think this 
a much better candidate for retaining a connection between empirical and 
non-empirical realities than any project that attempts to work its way out 
of the empirical box from the ground up. Hence, when considering alter­
natives to Clayton's panentheism, I believe I am perfectly within my intel­
lectual rights to turn to a pre-Cartesian model of metaphysics, which does 
not abandon classical form-matter distinctions. The model I draw on here 
is the modified (theistic) NeoPlatonism of St. Augustine of Hippo.
Augustine, with Plotinus, maintains that being is identical with good­
ness and vice versa. Moreover, Augustine, like Plotinus, maintains that 
God is Being itself: Being proper is innate and natural to only God, and 
the same is true of Goodness, for the two are interchangeable and innate 
in God alone. Creaturely being is therefore always derivative—as is crea- 
turely goodness. Unlike Plotinus, however, Augustine seeks to retain a 
Creator-creature gap when building on this metaphysical foundation. To 
achieve this end, Augustine parts ways with Plotinus in two key areas: 
(1) Augustine rejects the idea that creaturely being/goodness is derived 
directly from God through emanation or an overflow of Being, and (2) 
Augustine denies that primordial, uninformed matter is eternal. Begin­
ning with the former, Augustine affirms the orthodox Christian doctrine, 
creatio ex nihilo: creation is called into being out of nothing. And to be 
sure, Augustine denies outright the notion that because we have the noun 
"nothing" (nihil), it must refer to some-thing; nothing indicates the absence 
of anything in eternity other than God himself.52 As for the "existence" of 
primordial matter, Augustine maintains that matter, like all else distinct 
from God, is created.53 Unlike Plotinus, eternity does not hold both pure 
actuality (God) and pure potentiality (matter); eternity belongs to only the 
pure actuality that is God, while all of creation is called into being by the 
voice of the Deity.54
Augustine's affirmation of creatio ex nihilo, rightly understood, should 
not conjure images of creatures simply popping into existence within a 
dark void. Augustine understands the divine call to existence to manifest 
temporally in a gradual process of forming: matter begins in an unformed 
state; it is informed; ontic qualities manifest in matter, analogous to the
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way a seed develops; and in due course creatures manifest their proper 
form.55 To help parse this picture, I will take my cues from Augustine by 
causally dividing God's creative activity into the creation of matter and the 
forming of matter. (This division is causal, rather than temporal, because 
Augustine holds that form and matter, while distinguishable, cannot actu­
ally exist separately.)56
Beginning with matter itself, Augustine holds, as stated above, that God 
creates matter ex nihilo. Matter, in itself, is neither good (since goodness is 
a quality of being) nor evil (since Augustine defines evil as a privation of 
goodness or being,57 which primordial matter has yet to possess). Matter 
is therefore conceived of as metaphysically neutral or, at best, good in a 
qualified sense, given its potential to bear form.58 This potential for form is 
a given in this scheme because Augustine presumes, with the bulk of early 
Christian thinkers,59 that matter is properly defined as pure potentiality, 
which, as such, is mutable (it is capable of taking on any number of forms 
and continually changes for either better or worse) and necessarily tempo­
ral (for Augustine equates time with the successive motion, or mutation, 
from one state to another).60
Regarding the forming of matter, we may characterize Augustine's vi­
sion as a divine act of drawing. Within the Word or Wisdom of God, there 
exist the Ideas that serve as archetypes for God's creation.61 That which God 
chooses to create is "made" in an instant62—God calls the heavens and the 
earth into being as an entire world-system—and in this sense matter is in­
formed by the full plentitude of natures that will come to be in our world. 
But this informing is what we might describe as a seedling deposit. Matter 
must still move from its unformed state to its formed state.63 God draws 
matter toward himself (ontologically speaking), pulling it up from the 
lowest possible level of ontology—pure potentiality—toward the highest 
pole of ontology—the pure actuality that is God.64 In this drawing process, 
matter manifests the once-foreign properties of being—measure, form, 
and order (modus, species, ordo)65—in a way that mirrors the Ideas in God.66 
Matter takes on ontic qualities in increasing measure as it moves from 
the most humble modes of being toward its divine source.67 The manifest 
being/goodness of creation is therefore a responsive being/goodness: as 
matter moves toward God it becomes ontologically more like God, taking 
on order, manifesting actuality, and displaying numerous perfections.68 
Creation images the various ontological perfections stretching between 
the nothingness from whence it came and the God toward whom it is 
drawn. In this process, the Chain of Being informs matter by providing 
it with its divinely ordained telos, but this chain is manifest backwards in 
a bottom-up fashion, rising up from primordial matter through the on­
tological hierarchies until it reaches the highest order of angels—though 
never merging with God directly.69
Notice that Augustine's concern to sustain a Creator-creature distinction 
is the very thing that pushes his metaphysic toward a vision that fits the 
basic picture of organic development in contemporary science. If Clayton 
is right in his assessment that modern science presses our understand­
ing of organism in general and of mind in particular toward a bottom-up 
picture of emergence, then Augustine's metaphysical vision offers all the 
philosophical tools needed for theology to anticipate this conclusion. If
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Augustine's metaphysic is right, we should expect the most basic forms of 
organic life to come into existence first, followed by more complex organ­
isms. Moreover, the imagery of God drawing matter up out of the depths 
of mere potentiality is conceptually fitting for a gradual process of develop­
ment in which the species of our world are manifest. Creaturely develop­
ment in the science of organism is in perfect keeping with this conceptual 
outlook: out of primordial simplicity emerges an ontological hierarchy of 
fully formed, distinct species, which display increasing complexity. Rather 
than organic development being a blind process, determined solely by nat­
ural mechanisms, however, Augustine bids us to see in this development 
the very hand of God, drawing matter up from its primordial depths to 
higher, more majestic levels of existence, until each species, in due course, 
arrives at its divinely ordained telos.
Augustine's vision also offers a corrective, however. It cautions against 
an empiricism that presumes organic development points toward crea- 
turely or material autonomy, sustained and driven by the empirical side 
of reality.70 Augustine calls us, instead, to see "natural" processes as the 
empirical manifestation of God's eternal Wisdom. Matter, in its develop­
ments, is driven by teleology and the very will of God. Lying behind mate­
rial development are the Ideas within God; driving matter is the hand of 
God, which nurtures immanent form; and manifest in matter are and the 
ontological perfections that take shape in our world as God draws matter 
toward himself. The plentitude of species that appear in our world are not 
merely the surviving fit, but the diversity of fully formed links in the Great 
Chain of Being, chosen and ordered by the Deity.
An Augustinian model of organism, in short, is a teleological vision of 
empirical reality, which sees in the science of organism the will, Wisdom, 
and hand of God. It takes invisible realities to be the more fundamental 
side of our world. Not only is nature or essence prior to the empirical 
manifestation of species, these invisible realities ultimately drive the pro­
cess from the first. In such a model we can rightly expect that, from an 
empirical vantage point, emergence may appear to be bottom-up, as if 
higher, emergent entities were dependent upon lower entities. The chro­
nology of emergence, combined with our limited empirical faculties, can 
give this impression. But in the end, Augustine beckons us to see such 
emergence as rooted, not in natural mechanisms, but in God's Wisdom 
and decrees.71
To the extent the study of organism complements Augustine's meta­
physical vision of creation, I believe Augustine would see such scientific 
insight as a grace from God, just as he did "certain books of the Platonists, 
translated from Greek to Latin," that compelled him from Manicheism 
back to the Catholic faith.72 But what an Augustinian model of organism 
also offers is a sober warning. Augustine sang high praise of the insights 
of natural reason, going so far as to say in his Confessions, "there [in certain 
books of the Platonists] I read, by no means in these words, but in many 
ways the very same intent and purpose, that In the beginning was the Word 
and the Word was with God and the Word was God";73 and were Augustine still 
walking the earth today, his high view of natural reason may well prompt 
him to offer similar praise of the insights of natural sdence—especially 
those insights that testify to the bottom-up appearance of the Chain of
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Being out of nothing. Yet, Augustine was also quite sober in assessing the 
limits of natural reason: "But the truth, he came to his own and his own did not 
accept him, but those who receive him, he gave power to become sons of God, to 
they who believe on his name, I did not read."74 While Augustine maintains 
that natural reason may offer clear insights into the nature of our world 
and even, as in the case of the Platonists, draw the soul upward toward 
God,75 natural reason does not and cannot offer hope. Without the healing 
of the soul by Christ, the soul can, at best, only sees where it ought to go, 
but it invariably lacks the capacity to rise and walk.76
We must remember that the contemporary vision of organism, not only 
displays our creaturely rise from nothing to ever-increasing complexity; 
science also tells us that we inevitably breakdown, decay, and die. In Au­
gustine's view, this breakdown in and corruption of being is the very na­
ture of evil. When creation, by its own willing, turns from God—the source 
of its being—the creature inevitably turns toward the void of nothingness, 
and retreats back to the abyss from whence it came. The perfections of our 
human species thus include our moral state, that is, our posture toward 
God, which is part of our proper form—a form our species should will­
fully actualize by moving ever closer to God.77 Yet, having been crippled 
by our fall in Adam, only by our union with him who, "amid the inferior, 
built for himself a humble house of our clay" can our inevitable retreat 
toward nothing be undone. For the Word, having taken on the frailty of 
our flesh, "By means of this [frailty], subdues those who would be his and 
transports them to himself, healing their swelling and nourishing their 
love, that they may no longer trust their own strength, but become weak, 
seeing before their feet the divine become frail by participating in our cloak 
of skin. In their weariness they fall prostrate before this [divine] weakness, 
which lifts and raises them up."78 While science may testify to our emer­
gence from, and even our retreat toward, nothing, before the question of 
hope, science invariably falls silent. And in this silence, Augustine bids the 
soul to turn to God alone, for only by union with the immortal life of God 
in Christ can we hope to find healing.
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